Shelby To Gates: Tanker Needed Now
By
Boeing
Published: Tue, March 11, 2008 - 1:24 pm
Last Updated: Tue, March 11, 2008 - 1:34 pm
Last Updated: Tue, March 11, 2008 - 1:34 pm
"Our analysis of the data presented by the Air Force shows that this competition was seriously flawed and resulted in the selection of the wrong airplane for the warfighter," said Mark McGraw, vice president and program manager, Boeing Tanker Programs. "We have fundamental concerns with the Air Force's evaluation, and we are exercising our right under the process for a GAO review of the decision to ensure that the process by which America's next refueling tanker is selected is fair and results in the best choice for the U.S. warfighters and taxpayers."
Following a thorough analysis of data presented at a March 7 debriefing on the decision, Boeing concluded that what began as an effort by the Air Force to run a fair, open and transparent competition evolved into a process replete with irregularities. These irregularities placed Boeing at a competitive disadvantage throughout this competition and even penalized Boeing for offering a commercial-derivative airplane with lower costs and risks and greater protection for troops.
"It is clear that the original mission for these tankers -- that is, a medium-sized tanker where cargo and passenger transport was a secondary consideration -- became lost in the process, and the Air Force ended up with an oversized tanker," McGraw said. "As the requirements were changed to accommodate the bigger, less capable Airbus plane, evaluators arbitrarily discounted the significant strengths of the KC-767, compromising on operational capabilities, including the ability to refuel a more versatile array of aircraft such as the V-22 and even the survivability of the tanker during the most dangerous missions it will encounter."
Boeing is asking the GAO to examine several factors in the competition that were fundamentally flawed:
The contract award and subsequent reports ignore the fact that in reality Boeing and the Northrop/EADS team were assigned identical ratings across all five evaluations factors: 1) Mission Capability, 2) Risk, 3) Past Performance, 4) Cost/Price, and 5) Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment. Indeed, an objective review of the data as measured against the Request for Proposals shows that Boeing had the better offering in terms of Most Probable Life Cycle Costs, lower risk and better capability.
Flaws in this procurement process resulted in a significant gap between the aircraft the Air Force originally set out to procure -- a medium-size tanker to replace the KC-135, as stated in the request for proposal -- and the much larger Airbus A330-based tanker they ultimately selected. It is clear that frequent and often unstated changes during the course of the competition -- including manipulation of evaluation criteria and application of unstated and unsupported priorities among the key system requirements -- resulted in selection of an aircraft that was radically different from that sought by the Air Force and inferior to the Boeing 767 tanker offering.
Because of the way the Air Force treated Boeing's cost/price data, the company was effectively denied its right to compete with a commercial derivative product, contrary not only to the RFP but to federal statute and regulation. The Air Force refused to accept Boeing's Federal Acquisition Regulation-compliant cost/price information, developed over 50 years of building commercial aircraft, and instead treated the company's airframe cost/price information as if it were a military-defense product. Not only did this flawed decision deny the government the manufacturing benefits of Boeing's unique in-line production capability, subjecting the Air Force to higher risk, but it also resulted in a distortion of the price at which Boeing actually offered to produce tankers.
In evaluating Past Performance, the Air Force ignored the fact that Boeing -- with 75 years of success in producing tankers -- is the only company in the world that has produced a commercial derivative tanker equipped with an operational aerial-refueling boom. Rather than consider recent performance assessments that should have enhanced Boeing's position, the Air Force focused on relatively insignificant details on "somewhat relevant" Northrop/EADS programs to the disadvantage of Boeing's experience.
"Boeing offered an aircraft that provided the best value and performance for the stated mission at the lowest risk and lowest life cycle cost," said McGraw. "We did bring our A-game to this competition. Regrettably, irregularities in the process resulted in an inconsistent and prejudicial application of procurement practices and the selection of a higher risk, higher cost airplane that's less suitable for the mission as defined by the Air Force's own request for proposal. We are only asking that the rules of fair competition be followed."
News Map
Email to a Friend 
Printer Friendly 
Boeing can’t get over the fact that NG/EADS brought their A+ game and put forth more product for less money!
Boeing wanted a sole-source contract that specified the KC-767. That concept didn’t work with the sweetheart lease deal and it didn’t work in an open competition.